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Environmental economists have long touted tradable emission permit markets as cost-
effective tools for accomplishing pollution reduction goals (Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968; 
Montgomery, 1972). However, the literature has recognized that these policy tools may work 
less efficiently in the face of market imperfections such as market power (Hahn, 1984) and high 
transaction costs (Stavins, 1995). In the case of tradable permits for non-point source emissions 
such as waterborne nitrate or greenhouse gas (GHG) fluxes, observability can pose a serious 
problem for the functioning of a tradable permit market. Industrial sources might want to be able 
to pay farmers for pollution offset credits generated by changes in farm activities that reduce net 
pollution flows from their fields. However, it can be very difficult for a buyer to be certain about 
the quantity of pollution reduction generated even by observable farmer behaviors. Such 
pollutant flows themselves are not directly observable with current monitoring technologies and 
the relationship between farmer actions and pollution generation typically depends in complex 
ways on continuously stochastic variables such as temperature and rainfall. 
 
Uncertainty about pollution flows from agricultural sources subjects agricultural offsets to 
price discounts in tradable permit markets. Many markets for water-pollution permits effectively 
have such discounts by requiring point sources to trade with agricultural non-point sources at a 
trading ratio greater than one (Horan, 2001). Several papers (McCarl et al., 2003; Kim and 
McCarl, 2009) study the importance of uncertainty in markets for carbon offsets, finding that 
uncertainty does (and perhaps should) cause such offsets to be discounted at the Chicago Climate 
Exchange by about 15%. Kurkalova (2005) estimates that uncertainty in carbon sequestration 
outcomes in Iowan agriculture should yield a 9% price discount from an offset credit aggregator. 
The presence of such discounts will cause a tradable permit market to yield too little pollution 
reduction from agricultural sources relative to the cost-effective outcome, resulting in 
deadweight loss from misallocation of abatement among sources. 
 
Engineers and computer scientists are working currently to develop new technologies to 
produce accurate real-time measurements of pollution fluxes from agricultural fields (Panayiotou 
et al., 2005; Montgomery et al., 2007; Mariño et al., 2008). Small sensors can be connected in 
wireless networks to provide data to computer programs which translate flows of raw data into 
information about pollution that could be used by land owners and regulators. However, even 
inexpensive sensors are not free, and the area to be monitored could be very large. One would 
not incur the cost of installing and maintaining such a monitoring network unless the benefit to 
society of doing so was at least as large as the cost. Some studies have found that measurement 
technologies and protocols would generate large efficiency gains in markets for agricultural soil 
carbon sequestration (Mooney et al., 2004; Kurkalova et al., 2004). However, such analysis has 
been limited to carbon. It is not clear the results apply to markets for other GHGs (such as 
methane (CH4) or nitrous oxide (N2O)) which could be subjects of tradable permit regimes, 
because different management strategies are needed to reduce those emissions. 
 
In this paper, we estimate the extent to which social welfare could be improved by 
developing and employing new technology to increase the accuracy with which flows of N2O 
emissions from agricultural fields can be monitored, and we demonstrate how that welfare 
improvement depends on the nature of the emission-generation process. We use a hypothetical 
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case study of a situation in which farmers can reduce N2O emissions from Midwest agricultural 
land parcels and sell the resulting offset permits in a GHG tradable permit market. We simulate 
market outcomes with and without technology that increases the accuracy of emission estimates, 
reduces the discount to which agricultural offset permits are subject, and improves the 
performance of tradable permit system. We find that the benefits from such technology are fairly 
modest, but range as high as $138 for a 100 acre field if N2O emissions are an exponential 




GHG emissions are of major environmental concern because they have been implicated as 
causes of anthropogenic climate change (IPCC, 2007).  According to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), major GHGs include carbon dioxide (CO2), N2O, CH4, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride (SFl6).  
 
Cerri et al. (1996) find that agriculture is a major contributor of N2O and CH4 and CO2, 
explaining approximately 13.5 percent of global N2O and CH4 emissions (IPCC, 2007). GHG 
flux reductions can be achieved by farmers through changes in crop management practices. 
Nevertheless, such changes typically need to be stimulated either by government policies or by 
creation of markets which give incentives for such reductions. Numerous papers have studied the 
economic potential for soil carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and explored the relative 
virtues of different policies to encourage sequestration (Stavins, 1999; Antle et al., 2001; McCarl 
and Schneider, 2001; Lewandrowski et al., 2004). Other work has studied reducing multiple 
types of GHG emissions from agriculture (Hyman et al., 2004; Brink et al., 2005; De Cara et al., 
2005; Golub et al., 2009; Vermont and De Cara, 2010).  
 
N2O emissions in the U.S. Midwest are affected heavily by the use of fertilizer nitrogen (N) 
in row crop agriculture; such emissions can be reduced significantly by changing fertilizer use 
rates. Numerous papers have documented a linear relationship between N and N2O, leading the 
IPCC to use such a relationship in its integrated assessments (IPCC, 2007; Halvorson et al,. 
2008). Other papers have argued that the relationship between N and N2O is nonlinear; the 
nonlinearity arises because emissions rise rapidly when there is residual fertilizer not used for 
growth by the crop (McSwiney and Robertson, 2005). The literature on this subject recognizes 
that N2O emissions from a specific field can be affected by factors such the crop which is grown 
(N absorption by the crop reduces emissions), climatic conditions, topography, tillage system, 
and the time of year at which the fertilizer is applied. For tractability (and because of data 
limitations) we abstract from a large number of factors that influence the exact quantity of N2O 
emissions from a given amount of N fertilizer on a specific field. However, we use a relationship 
between N and N2O estimated by Millar et al. (2010) which is tailored to conditions on soy-corn 
fields in the lower Midwest, and thus captures some specifics of N2O generation from N fertilizer 
in a study area such as ours.  
 
This paper carries out a case study of N2O reduction policy on agricultural land parcels in 
the Upper Embarras Watershed (UEW). The UEW is located in East-Central Illinois, lying 
primarily in Champaign and Douglas counties. We use the boundary of this sub-watershed given 
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by shape files from the USGS with hydrologic unit boundaries and codes.
1 We use a GIS dataset 
on land parcels provided by the Champaign County Development Services Office in Champaign, 
IL, and extract agricultural parcels in that county that lie within the UEW.
2 The database 
included information on parcel acreage and average productivity index (API), an important 
measure of soil quality. The final dataset contained observations on 1,361 parcels. Agriculture in 
this area is dominated by large fields devoted to corn/soybean rotations, and the soil is of very 




In a well-functioning market for tradable emission permits, pollution sources will end up 
choosing emission levels such that their marginal costs of pollution reduction are equal to each 
other (if marginal costs vary between two sources, the high cost source will have an incentive to 
pay the low cost source to do some of its required abatement). Thus, total pollution reduction is 
accomplished at the smallest total cost to society. However, if uncertainty causes some sources to 
face a price that is lower than the price faced by other sources, cost-effectiveness will not be 
achieved. We use data on agriculture parcels in the UEW to develop a model that can simulate 
the response of farmers in the UEW to a hypothetical market for GHG permits into which they 
could sell offsets produced by reducing N2O emissions from their fields. We simulate the 
functioning of such a market when offsets from these fields are subject to a discount because 
agricultural N2O emissions are measured with high uncertainty. We then estimate the benefit to 
society of a new technology that reduces measurement uncertainty and improves the cost-
effectiveness of the market outcome. 
 
3.1 Estimation of marginal abatement cost curves 
 
Environmental economic theory tells us that profit-maximizing farmers will choose N 
levels to reduce N2O such that the cost of the last unit of pollution reduction (marginal abatement 
cost, or MAC(N2O) ) is equal to the price they can receive for a unit of reduction (or abatement). 
Thus, to predict farmer participation in a market for N2O offset permits we need to estimate 
marginal abatement cost curves for acres of land in the different parcels in the watershed. 
 
To do this, we observe that farmers make per acre profits that can be represented as 
quadratic functions of their rate of N use (Figure 1).  
 
2
12 NN            ( 1 )  
 
Profits rise with fertilizer use over a range of application rates, but too much fertilizer is both 
expensive and bad for crop growth. We assume that with no incentive to reduce N use, farmers 
will choose to apply fertilizer at the profit-maximizing rate N
*. This is consistent with a neo-
classical approach to modeling decision makers. However, some research indicates that farmers 
apply more fertilizer than the recommended profit-maximizing rate because of distrust of 
recommendations, risk aversion, or complementarities among inputs (Sheriff, 2005). Future 
                                                            
1 The UEW has HUC 10 code 0512011201. 
2  Invalid and inappropriate records were omitted (such as lots with zero acreage and negative farmland values). 
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research on this subject could adapt our basic model to different assumptions about farmer 
behavior to evaluate the effect on the model’s results of phenomena that induce over-application. 
 
Figure 1. Profit as a Function of Nitrogen Application 
 
 
As discussed in Section 2, we model N2O emissions caused by human behavior as an 
increasing function of N (Millar et al., 2010). That equation can be linear or nonlinear: 
 
2 : linear N O N    where  δ = 4.684,
3              (2) 
 
2 : exp{ } nonlinear N O c N    where  298*(44/ 28), .0082. c            (3) 
 
Thus, there is a profit maximizing level of N2O (N2O
*) which is the amount of N2O 
associated with a fertilizer application rate of N
*. These conditions imply that the marginal 
abatement cost curve for reducing N2O from a field is a downward sloping line or curve where 
the marginal cost is equal to zero at N2O
* (see Figure 2). The marginal abatement cost (MAC) of 
reducing a unit of N2O emissions is equal to the foregone marginal benefit to the farmer of that 
unit. At the profit maximizing fertilizer application rate, the marginal contribution of fertilizer to 
profit is very small and thus the profit lost by cutting fertilizer (and hence N2O emissions) is also 
very small. At low levels of fertilizer use, however, reducing fertilizer more has a large 
deleterious effect on crop yields and hence profit, and so the marginal cost of reducing N2O 
emissions by one unit is high when emissions are already low. 
                                                            
3 N2O emissions in pounds of CO2 equivalent emissions are N2O = (0.01 * N) * (44/28) * 298. The molecular weight 






12 NN       
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Marginal Benefit of Emissions 
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12 NN      . The MAC of reducing N2O is the marginal benefit of that foregone unit. 
b N2O emissions are measured in units of CO2-equivalent GHG emissions.  
c Area W is the increase in social welfare from the sale of N2Om
* offset credits. 
d Nonlinear model assumes  2 exp{ } NO c N    where  298*(44/ 28), 1/ , .0082 cc     . 
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Table 1. Recommended Nitrogen Application Rates with  
Corresponding Expected Yields and Profits 
 









Low 163.52  174.28  595.03 
Profit maximizing  188.84  176.28  596.46 
High 212.60  177.52  595.50 
 
a The nitrogen recommendations are obtained from the Iowa State University Extension N rate 
calculator  (http://extension.agron.iastate.edu/soilfertility/nrate.aspx). The profit-maximizing 
level of N is not typically equal to the yield maximizing level (Sawyer et al. 2006). The 
calculator also provides “high” and “low” recommended rates which are associated with profits 
no more than $1.00/acre lower than that associated with the profit maximizing level of N. 
b We assume the price of corn is $3.63/bu and the price of N fertilizer is $0.23/lb. Source: Farm 
Decision Outreach Central, University of Illinois, http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu. 
c We assume a field with soybean/corn rotation and an API equal to 117. 
d Yield is calculated from Sawyer (2006). 
e Profit per acre is calculated as П = Pcorn*Yield – PN*N rate. 
 
 
We parameterize MAC curves like those shown in Figure 2 for agricultural parcels in the 
UEW by taking the following steps. First, we estimate the slope of a typical marginal cost curve 
for N reduction on soybean/corn rotation fields in Central Illinois by fitting a quadratic curve to 
estimates of profits for three different levels of fertilizer: low, profit-maximizing, and high (see 
Table 1). Equation (4) gives the resulting fitted equation:  
 
2 524.8 0.7520* ( 0.001974)* NN     .        ( 4 )  
            
Second, we estimate the manner in which N
* varies with soil quality as measured by the 
API. We use N
* levels recommended by a fertilizer-rate calculator
4 for three different API values 
that could obtain on farmland in Illinois to estimate an equation that predicts N
* for the value of 
API that obtains for parcel i. Equation (5) gives the result: 
 
* 304.8 ( 1.115)* ii NA P I         ( 5 )  
 
This gives us a parcel specific marginal cost of reducing N, where the intercept Ni
* is given by 
Equation (5). We make the simplifying assumption that the slope of MAC(N) (that is, 2β2) is 
fixed across parcels, but its x-intercept N
* shifts with each parcel’s API. Since 
*
12 /2 N     
then we define for each parcel
*
12 2 ii N   . 
 
                                                            
4 Source: The nitrogen recommendations are obtained from the Iowa State University Extension N rate calculator 
(http://extension.agron.iastate.edu/soilfertility/nrate.aspx). We assume soy/corn rotation and a price ratio of N to 
corn equal to 0.063. 
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Third, we use Equations (2) and (3) to derive marginal cost curves for reductions of N2O 
emissions (in pounds of CO2 equivalent GHG emissions) in the linear and nonlinear cases:  
 
2 11















.      ( 7 )  
 
The result is a set of 1,361 pairs of marginal abatement cost curves, one pair for a 
representative acre of land on each parcel in the study area. In terms of N, those curves have the 
same slopes but their point of intercept with the horizontal axis varies with soil quality on the 
parcel. When N2O is a linear function of N, the MAC curves in terms of N2O still have identical 
slopes, but that is not true when N translates into N2O in a nonlinear fashion.  
 
3.2 Simulation of market scenarios 
 
Figure 2 shows the N2O emissions a farmer will choose on each acre of land when there is 
no GHG offset market (N2O
*) and when the farmer can receive price P in an offset market for 
each unit of CO2 equivalent GHG emissions that is reduced (N2Om). In general, farmers will 
choose emissions such that the marginal abatement cost is equal to the price they can receive for 
units of abatement. Thus, abatement increases with the price. Social welfare increases by the area 
W in Figure 2 because it is cheaper for sources with marginal cost equal to P to pay farmers to 
reduce emissions from their fields; total social abatement costs are lower. If the permit price is 
exogenous to farmers, then farmers’ producer surplus will increase by area W. 
 
We estimate baseline N2O emissions, N2O abatement, and the social benefit W from 
trading for an acre of each parcel in our study area. These calculations are simple for the linear 
model, but require calculation in Mathematica for the nonlinear model. We then aggregate these 
numbers to find total abatement and the benefit of trading for society. This process is repeated 
for three different scenarios. In all three cases we assume a market for tradable GHG permits 
exists, and the market price reflects the true industry marginal cost of abatement. Metcalf (2009) 
suggest that a U.S. carbon pricing policy of energy related carbon emissions due to either a tax or 
cap-and-trade system has a potential to raise carbon price to roughly $15 per ton or $0.0075 per 
pound;
5 we assume that price for our hypothetical market. In the first scenario we assume that 
farmers can receive the true market price of $15 for an offset; this would be true if technology 
exists to permit perfect measurement of N2O flows or if market rules were such that offset 
aggregators would be held harmless if actual N2O flows did not end up being equal to the 
estimated amounts.  
 
In the second and third scenarios we assume that imperfect emission measurement and 
legal structures cause agricultural offsets to receive a lower price than that which the market 
would naturally support. While farmers and point-source emitters may be profit maximizing, the 
regulators and policy makers who set the rules of the marketplace may choose to codify a penalty 
                                                            
5 1 short ton = 2000 lb. 
129Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 122-136
 
 
on abatement accomplished by non-point sources if those policy makers are risk averse and 
concerned more with accomplishing abatement than with reducing damages from pollution 
(Horan, 2001). In scenario two, farmers receive a price that is 9% below market (Kurkalova, 
































































   $1.01 
($0.11) 
 
a Each cell gives the mean with standard deviations in parentheses, calculated over a representative acre for each of 
1,361 individual parcels. 
b GHG offset prices are dollars per pound of CO2 equivalent GHG emissions per year. 
c Emissions and reductions are expressed in 1,000 lbs of CO2 equivalent emissions per year and assume the parcels 
are all in the corn phase of a corn/soy rotation.
  
 





























$.00750/lb  3,349 5.3%  $12,557 
($15.62)  26,925 18%  $110,634 
($137.66) 
$.00682/lb  3,045 4.8%  $10,383 
($12.92)  25,040 17%  $92,961 
($115.67) 
$.00637/lb  2,844 4.5%  $9,059 
($11.27)  23,748 16%  $81,983 
($102.01) 
 
a GHG gas offset prices are dollars per pound of CO2 equivalent GHG emissions per year. 
b Emissions and reductions are expressed in 1,000 lbs of CO2 equivalent emissions per year and assume the parcels 
are all in the corn phase of a corn/soy rotation.
  
c The baseline aggregate N2O
 emissions are 63,589 1,000lb/yr for the linear case and 150,574 for the nonlinear case. 
d Total social surplus from trading (W) is given, with value per 100 acres in the study in parentheses. The latter 
equals total social welfare divided by total acres in the study area (80,368) multiplied by 100.  
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Tables 2 and 3 give the results of the simulated price scenarios. We focus first on the 
results that obtain when N2O emissions are a linear function of fertilizer application rates. 
Average N2O reductions per acre would be only.035 pounds in the scenario with the lowest 
price; there is no variation in per-acre reduction because the slopes of all the marginal abatement 
cost curves for N2O reductions are the same. Those reductions add up to 2,844 thousand pounds 
in the entire study area. Eliminating the price discount entirely would bring those numbers up to 
.042 pounds per acres and 3,349 thousand pounds overall, an 18% increase. These are not large 
proportionate reductions in emissions, only ranging from 4.5% with the lowest price to 5.3% 
with the highest price.  
 
When N2O emissions are a linear function of N rates, the benefit to society of the best no-
discount price scenario is $0.16/acre ($12,557 over the study area), which is $0.05 ($3,498 
overall) higher than what we would gain if uncertainty caused a 15% price discount. Thus, if 
technology prevents a 15% discount, society gains $4.35 for every 100 acres. If the absence of 
good monitoring technology meant the market would not exist at all, we can think of the benefit 
of such technology as being $15.62 per 100 acres. 
 
The results are very different when N2O emissions are an exponential function of fertilizer 
application rates. Average baseline N2O emission rates are 1.87 pounds per acre, up from .789 
pounds per acre in the linear results. Because profit maximizing baseline fertilizer application 
rates vary across parcels with their average soil quality, the marginal abatement cost curves for 
N2O reductions have heterogeneous shapes. As a result, a given offset price induces 
heterogeneous N2O reductions per acres across parcels and yields varied per-acre increases in 
social welfare, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Average N2O reductions range across scenarios from 
.333 (with no price discount) to .294 (with the biggest price discount) pounds per acre; those 
reductions are larger in absolute value and as a percentage of baseline emissions than the per acre 
reductions of the linear model.  
 
The benefits to society of offset trading are almost an order of magnitude higher in the 
scenarios with nonlinear N2O emission production. The increase in social surplus from offset 
trading ranges from $1.01/acre with the lowest price ($81,983 over the study area) to $1.37/acre 
with the highest price ($110,634 overall). Technology that eliminated a 15% price discount 
would have a social value of about $36 per 100 acres. If uncertainty prevented trading entirely, 




Early studies of N2O emissions from row-crop agriculture modeled N2O emissions as a 
linear function of fertilizer application rates. If that model holds true, our results imply that N2O 
emission offset sales have limited potential in corn/soybean fields such as those found in Central 
Illinois. In our study area, even a perfect market induced farmers only to reduce N2O emissions 
by around 5%. The benefits of technology that would increase the accuracy of N2O emission 
monitoring (and thus eliminate any price discount associated with uncertainty about agricultural 
emissions) would be at most $15 for a 100-acre field – probably too small to justify the 
technology. 
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Figure 3. Per Acre N2O Reductions, by Parcel
a 
 
a Results are for no price-discount scenario and N2O a nonlinear function of N. 
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Figure 4. Per Acre Social Surplus from Trading, by Parcel
a 
 
a Results are for no price-discount scenario and N2O a nonlinear function of N. 
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However, recent work (McSwiney and Robertson, 2005; Millar et al., 2010) emphasizes 
the nonlinear nature of N2O emission generation as a function of fertilizer application rates. If 
this model holds true, then a perfectly functioning market for N2O offset credits could induce 
farmers to reduce N2O emissions by as much as 18%. The benefit of technology that helps this 
market to exist could range as high as $138 for a 100-acre field. Improvements in sensor 
technology might well bring the cost of this kind of infrastructure down to where its benefits 
justify its costs. 
 
The profit per acre to be gained from a well-functioning market varies across space with a 
standard deviation that is 11% of the mean (as shown in Figure 4). Some farmers will surely find 
it in their own best interests to install such technology, though others may not. As long as policy 
allows trades when monitoring technology is installed only on the fields that are involved in 
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